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Abstract—Some of the new trends emerging in future wireless
networks enable a vastly increased fluidity in accessing a wide
range of resources, thus supporting flexible network composition
and dynamic allocation of resources to virtual network operators
(VNOs). In this work we study a new resource allocation
opportunity that is enabled by the cloud radio access network
architecture. In particular, we investigate the relationship be-
tween the cloud-based antennas and spectrum as two important
resources in virtualized wireless networks. We analyze the in-
terplay between spectrum and antennas in the context of an
auction-based allocation mechanism through which VNOs can
bid for a combination of the two types of resources. Our analysis
shows that the complementarity and partial substitutability of the
two resources significantly impact the results of the allocation of
those resources and uncovers the possibility of divergent interests
between the spectrum and the infrastructure providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Extreme virtualization [1], sees future networks as entities
composed out of consumable commodities, many of which
will be shared and where the boundary between pure software
and hardware resources is blurred. This pool of commodities
consists of highly heterogeneous resources: infrastructure,
remote radio heads (RRHs), spectrum, storage, processing
power, information content, knowledge, backhaul, hypervisors,
etc. In our vision, future virtual network operators (VNOs)
construct their networks from this shared pool of resources,
which enables them to dynamically use and release resources
according to their demand [2].
In this work, we investigate the complex relationships
between network resources and a mechanism to allocate re-
sources to VNOs. In particular, we study the substitutability of
spectrum and massive cloud-based antennas. These two types
network resources are partially substitutable, which means that
spectrum and cloud-based antennas are interchangeable only
after the VNO has acquired a minimum required amount of
spectrum and number of antennas. The partial substitutability
of these resources and the dynamic demand of VNOs for them
introduce a new and interesting resource management problem
which is different from the conventional methods of spectrum
and/or infrastructure management.
We consider the cloud-based massive-MIMO (Multiple In-
put Multiple Output) antennas as a resource that multiple
VNOs can share at the same time. The shared infrastructure
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could be provided by the existing network operators to reduce
their operational costs. Deploying a public network is another
option that can contribute to the pool of shared infrastructure
[3]. Dynamic infrastructure sharing also creates opportunities
for new technology ventures and opens the market to small
size and local infrastructure providers.
On the other hand, in order to allow operators to maintain
some quality assurances in deploying new services, we assume
that spectrum resources should be orthogonally allocated to
the operators. Spectrum can be made available through the
new frameworks that are envisioned in the 3.5 GHz Citizens
Broadband Radio Service [4] and Licensed Shared Access
(LSA) licensing scheme. This approach of spectrum and
infrastructure management is in line with the radio access
network (RAN) sharing scenario proposed by the 3rd Gen-
eration Partnership Project (3GPP) in [5], where the RAN is
shared between the participating operators while each of them
transmits on orthogonal portions of the licensed spectrum.
In our approach, spectrum is auctioned to the demanding
VNOs and its final price is determined by the market. In par-
ticular, we propose a hybrid auction model which is performed
by a third party auctioneer for the combined acquisition of
spectrum and antennas. The results reveal a complex interplay
between antennas and spectrum in an auction-based allocation,
and show the presence of potential divergent interests between
the spectrum and the infrastructure providers. The auction
mechanism and the possible scenarios of having collocated
and distributed cloud-based massive-MIMO antennas are sum-
marised in Figure 1. We will discuss these scenarios and the
auction mechanism in the following sections. We begin with a
brief introduction to market-based resource allocation in wire-
less networks in Section II. Major features of the Cloud RAN
architecture are described in Section III. Section IV describes
the auction-based allocation mechanism through which VNOs
can bid for a combination of antennas and spectrum resources.
Section V analyzes the impact of the complex relation between
the two types of resources on an auction-based allocation
mechanism. We summarize our conclusions and point towards
directions for future work in Section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Auctioning is a well-known approach for selling goods to
the highest bidder, and in the context of resource management
it is an effective way of allocating the resources to the
ones who value them the most [6]. Unlike auction-based
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Fig. 1: The proposed ecosystem; VNOs request antennas (at a fixed price) and bid for spectrum to satisfy the rate required by their subscribers. The cloud-based
antennas can be collocated massive MIMO antennas or fiber-connected distributed MIMO antennas.
approaches, in non-market-based models normally a central
entity optimizes its utility subject to some constraints on the
minimum data rate required by the VNOs [7]. Generally such
centralized systems treat requests from the VNOs similarly and
satisfy a fairness metric. Therefore, in this type of systems
the resource assignment decision is made centrally, without
direct participation from VNOs, while in the market-based
approaches the VNOs decide their bids and the resources are
assigned to the VNOs that value them the most. Moreover,
auction-based approaches typically have a lower computa-
tional complexity than the centralized approaches, since bids
are decided in a distributed fashion.
Previous research on market-based resource allocation in
wireless networks has focused on homogeneous radio re-
sources, typically owned by a single entity [6]. For example,
auction models have been proposed to allocate downlink
bandwidth provided by a single network operator [8]. Auction
theory has also been used to model access to secondary
spectrum [9]. Other works have focused on auctioning network
capacity provided by one network operator [10]. Only recently
the auctioning of multiple heterogeneous resources has started
to attract attention [11]. The authors of that work proposed
a hierarchical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to jointly assign
infrastructure and spectrum and analyzed the allocation ef-
ficiency of the proposed schemes. In our work, similarly to
[11], we auction both antennas and spectrum, but with two
important differences. First and foremost, the focus in this
paper is on the effects of the complementarity and partial
substitutability of spectrum and antennas on the auction-
based resource allocation scheme, with special attention to
the implications of disjoint ownership of those resources.
Secondly, in our model we consider the cloud-based massive-
MIMO antennas as a resource that multiple VNOs can share
at the same time. This is particularly important in view of the
3RAN sharing scenarios proposed by 3GPP in [12].
III. CRAN ARCHITECTURE
The concept of extreme sharing intertwines with the design
of submissive network components: components which are not
biased towards any particular technology or model of usage,
but can be configured dynamically to accommodate a range
of functionalities. In light of this, we have chosen to focus
on the Cloud RAN (CRAN) architecture as the basis of our
discussion.
In a CRAN, baseband processing units are decoupled from
the radio frontends and located in a remote facility. This
allows for a centralized and scalable operation and manage-
ment of resources, including processing resources, antennas,
radio frontends, etc. Software radio and cloud computing
technologies are combined with centralization to fully exploit
the scalability and flexibility of the network architecture.
Most other works on CRAN consider a pool of baseband
processing resources only. In this paper we consider a CRAN
architecture where a switch interconnects (a subset of) the
processing units in the cloud to (a subset of) the RRHs.
Together with software radio and cloud computing principles,
this architecture allows any processing unit to dynamically
select the antennas to transmit signals to (or receive signals
from).
The potential for advanced resource management a CRAN
can offer contrasts with what can be done in a classical
non-CRAN architecture. In traditional networks, the baseband
processing units are co-located with the antenna in the base
station and designed to operate in a fixed portion of the
spectrum using a fixed number of antennas, therefore support-
ing a limited number of users. As a consequence, network
capabilities are delimited during the planning or network
deployment phase.
The CRAN is a multi-antenna system where antennas can
either be co-located or distributed (virtual antenna array). In
both cases, users can be spatially-multiplexed if the number
of users is less than or equal the number of antennas [13].
In practice, the multiplexing gain is limited by the spatial
correlation between channel vectors associated to different
users and by the ability of the network to acquire channel
state information.
A useful property of multi-antenna systems is that the
average user data rate increases with the number of antennas,
even if the user is equipped with a single antenna. The rate
is known to increase logarithmically in co-located antenna
systems as long as user spatial signatures are still orthogonal.
The behaviour in distributed systems remains unknown for the
general case. For the particular case where antenna selection
and regularized zero forcing precoding are employed, it is
shown in [14] that the achievable rate increases logarithmically
with the number of antennas. Therefore, in the remaining of
the paper we will assume this logarithmic relation between
rate and number of antennas, which is valid for distributed or
co-located systems.
Antennas and spectrum become fungible resources capable
to interchangeably provide a service to the user (rate). For
example, consider a user equipped with a single-antenna
terminal requesting a 1 Mbps service. Assuming a signal-to-
noise (SNR) ratio of 10 dB, the network needs to designate
approximately 3 MHz to that user if only 1 antenna is used. Al-
ternatively, the network can use 10 antennas to jointly transmit
the signal to that user and needs to designate only 1.5 MHz,
with the additional advantage of reusing the same channel to
transmit to 9 other users. In this study, we will ignore the
multiplexing gains and focus on the additional gains obtained
by an excess number of antennas (power gains). A similar
tradeoff is possible with transmission power: the same rate can
be achieved by an excess of transmission power or frequency
or spatial degrees of freedom. For simplicity, throughout this
paper we will assume constant power allocation for all users.
When looking at many users being served by a VNO, the
problem is essentially the same: the VNO needs to provide
a sum-rate to its K users, which is achieved by allocating a
certain amount of spectrum and number of antennas. While the
users of the same VNO share the same spectrum, the spectrum
cannot be shared among VNOs. The main limitation here is the
fact that each VNO has channel knowledge about its users and
computes the precoding matrix based on that. Subscribers to
other VNOs are seen as interference and thus we assume each
VNO uses a different portion of the spectrum. This limitation
does not occur with the antennas. Different signals can easily
be transmitted at different frequencies using the same antenna;
thus, VNOs can share the antennas whereas they cannot share
the spectrum.
IV. THE AUCTION PROCESS
The auction process described here and illustrated by Fig-
ure 1 is a hybrid model for the combined acquisition of
spectrum and antennas. In our model antennas can be shared
among all the operators, while spectrum resources are orthogo-
nally assigned to each operator. There is a fee associated to the
usage of each antenna per operator, which affects the spectrum
cost. This is because spectrum and antennas are partially
substitute goods and, at the same time, complementary goods.
In fact, as discussed in the previous section, in a CRAN ar-
chitecture spectrum and antennas are partially interchangeable
resources. This implies that the demand for one resource will
vary with the cost associated to the other resource. Antennas
and spectrum are also complementary goods. For example,
this means that if the cost incurred for the acquisition of
infrastructure is too high, the remaining budget might not
be sufficient to acquire the spectrum resources necessary to
deliver a given service. In view of the interconnection between
these two commodities, we designed a hybrid auction model
that allows operators to bid for a combination of antennas and
spectrum.
We have chosen a clock auction approach for the simplicity
it affords to the bidder in putting winning packages together
and for the way that it allows bidders to quickly discover
prices in a complex market. The clock auction operates in two
main phases, the price discovery (clock) phase and the final
assignment phase, described in the remainder of the section.
In the clock phase the auctioneer repeatedly posts a fixed
price for a unit of spectrum (1 KHz) on sale to the bidders
4in a series of rounds, while the antenna price is kept constant
throughout the auction. The term clock is used as the price is
monotonically ascending, i.e. it can only be ticked upwards
during the clock phase of the auction. In each round the
bidders can indicate that they will buy packages of the items at
the prices indicated. In our model, each bidder determines the
number of antennas and the amount of spectrum that satisfy
a minimum rate requirement, while minimizing the cost. The
cost is a linear combination of the selected number of antennas
and bandwidth at the prices indicated by the auctioneer. If
this cost is lower than the buyer’s private valuation, the buyer
submits its package bid to the auctioneer. If the auctioneer
detects excess demand for the spectrum after a round of
bidding has closed, it increases the posted price and opens
another round of bidding. Again, the bidders can indicate
that they will buy packages of the items at the higher price
indicated. As the price of spectrum increases at each round,
each bidder asks for less spectrum and more antennas, due
to the antenna/spectrum partial interchangeability in a CRAN.
During the clock phase the bidders discover prices at near
the competitive equilibrium, i.e. prices that roughly match
supply with demand. In fact the clock price discovery phase
approximates a second-price auction. We have modeled our
implementation of the clock price discovery phase in our
auction on that proposed in [15].
The clock phase of the auction ends when all excess demand
is removed from the market; in an ideal situation the prices
would stop rising when supply exactly equals demand. How-
ever, in complex multi-item-unit, multi-item-type auctions it is
unlikely that this will occur. Hence, the approach used in this
part of the auction may result in the oversupply of spectrum
at the final spectrum price. This will happen if the bidders’
private valuation of the minimum required rate is lower than
the corresponding cost to acquire spectrum and antennas at
the demanded clock price. If this situation arises then the
bids are assigned using a revenue maximizing approach, i.e.
using a winner determination algorithm to determine which
combination of the bids that stood at the last clock price which
caused excess demand will maximise the auctioneer’s revenue.
The winner determination problem is formulated using the
branch-on-bids approach. Bids are chosen so that the combined
“antenna+spectrum” revenue is maximized and the constraint
on the available spectrum is satisfied. The branching factor of
the search tree is two and its depth is at most equal to the
number of bids. Since this formulation is exponential in the
number of bids, some instances of the winner determination
problem may require too long to get the optimal solution.
However, if an anytime search algorithm is adopted, a feasible
solution can be obtained by terminating the algorithm after
a certain amount of time. At each round each bidder puts
together a package of antennas and spectrum that satisfy the
bidder’s rate requirement whilst minimizing the cost. This is an
integer optimization problem. Since the rate is monotonically
increasing with the number of antennas and spectrum, the rate
constraint is always satisfied with equality and the problem can
be converted into the minimization of a monotonic function
of one variable (number of antennas), with complexity linear
with the number of antennas.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we put the described concepts into action and
discuss the auction-based mechanism described in Section IV.
We simulate a scenario with 20 VNOs, each one bidding to
acquire a package of spectrum and infrastructure resources
necessary to deliver a given service to their users, which
are randomly distributed in the considered area. There is
an infrastructure provider which owns 64 antennas. In the
presented simulations, we consider the M = 64 antennas
are co-located in a massive multi-antenna array. Under the
assumptions discussed in Section III, similar results are ob-
tained if the 64 single-antenna RRH are randomly distributed
in the same area. Pilot contamination effects are ignored and
backhaul is assumed ideal. The CRAN employs a TDD scheme
with pilot-based training, with full channel state information
(CSI) being known at the CRAN and the number of users
K satisfies M ≥ K. The total available spectrum is 50
MHz. In the remainder of this section, the requirements for a
service are expressed in terms of minimum rate requirement.
Each operator assigns a constant maximum utility to the
acquisition of 1 Kbps. This means that each operator’s overall
budget is proportional to the required rate. All operators are
homogeneous in terms of budget, minimum rate requirement,
and subscribers distribution.
In the remainder of this section, we study the effects of
different antenna prices and minimum required rate on a
number of system performance metrics. We start by analysing
the overall revenue and the number of allocated VNOs, both
shown in Figure 2, as a function of the minimum required rate
and antenna cost (expressed as a percentage of each VNO’s
budget per Kbps). As expected, the number of winning VNOs
decreases when the minimum required rate increases, for a
given antenna cost. In fact, by increasing their demands, the
number of bids that can be accommodated by the capacity
of the pool of combined resources decreases. However, the
number of VNOs that successfully bid for resources also
decreases when the cost of antennas increases, for a given
minimum rate. This trend is not due to the physical limit of the
auctioned resources. We observe this behavior because high
antenna prices cause the VNOs to demand more spectrum;
since the spectrum is limited and not shared, the spectrum
requirement of all VNOs will not be satisfied. We can see a
clear dependence of the revenue, shown by colors in Figure 2,
on the number of winning VNOs, for any given minimum
requested rate. For example, let us consider a minimum rate
of 340 Mbps. We observe that the revenue is constant until
the antenna price reaches the value of the 113% of each Kbps
budget. At this point the number of allocated VNOs drops
(from 6 to 5) and so does the revenue. It is also worth noting
that, inside each region identified by the number of winning
bids, the revenue increases with the requested rate, for any
given antenna cost.
From the analysis of the results shown in Figure 2, it
would seem clear that a lower antenna cost benefits both the
auctioneer - as it results in higher revenue independently of the
requested rate - and the bidders - as it increases the number
of winning bids. However, the revenue shown in Figure 2 is a
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Fig. 2: Combined ”antenna+spectrum” revenue and the number of VNOs that
are able to obtain resources. Each pixel color shows the combined revenue
corresponding to a particular rate requirement (y axis) and antenna cost (x
axis). Regions corresponding to different numbers of winning VNOs are also
highlighted.
Fig. 3: Revenue resulting from antennas. Each pixel color shows the antenna
revenue corresponding to a particular rate requirement (y axis) and antenna
cost (x axis).
combined revenue resulting from the combined auction of two
types of resources. In the case of multiple ownership of the two
resources, i.e. when the infrastructure and spectrum providers
are distinct entities, it is interesting to look at the distribution
of the revenue for the two types of resources. Figure 3 shows
the revenue received from the allocation of antennas. For any
given minimum required rate, the antenna revenue increases
with the antenna cost. By comparing Figures 2 and 3 we
should note that the combined revenue and the antenna revenue
show opposing trends. This implies the presence of divergent
interests between the spectrum and the infrastructure provider.
We now look into the effects of our auction mechanism
on the resources allocated to each VNO, namely antennas
and bandwidth, respectively shown in Figures 4 and 5. These
results highlight the partial interchangeability of the two types
of resources under consideration and its implications for the
combined assignment of those resources. When the antenna
cost is low, for a range of cost values depending on the rate
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requirement, each winning VNO is allocated the maximum
number of available antennas; after a certain antenna cost
is reached, the number of allocated antennas is constantly
decreasing, for any given rate requirement. The bandwidth
requested by each VNO for any given rate requirement is at
first constant (in correspondence to the same range of values
for which the maximum number of antennas is allocated)
and then increases with the antenna cost. As expected, both
allocated antennas and spectrum decrease with the minimum
rate, for a given antenna cost. However, in the case of antennas,
this only happens after a certain antenna cost is reached.
This implies that when antennas are cheap enough, in case
of decrease in the rate requirement it is more convenient for
the bidders to acquire less bandwidth whilst still bidding for
the maximum number of antennas.
Figure 6 shows the final spectrum cost per KHz after the
clock phase. In our model increasing the price of antennas
causes a reduction in the spectrum price, independently of
the required rate. This results from a number of factors:
the assumption of a constant maximum budget per Kbps,
the requirement on the minimum number of antennas, the
complementarity of antennas and spectrum. When the in-
frastructure cost increases, bidders opt for acquiring more
6Fig. 6: Final spectrum price per KHz in correspondence to a particular rate
requirement (y axis) and antenna cost (x axis).
spectrum. However, due to the complementarity of the two
types of resources and, eventually, to the requirement on
the minimum number of antennas, a larger fraction of the
budget is used for the acquisition of antennas. Hence, the
remaining part of the budget, which determines the length
of the clock phase and, consequently, the final spectrum
price, decreases. This determines the reduction in the spectrum
clearing price observed in Figure 6. These results show that a
lower infrastructure cost does not just imply a better overall
revenue for the spectrum provider, but also a higher revenue
per unit of auctioned bandwidth.
VI. DISCUSSION
The complex relation between the different resources that
compose a network is bound to have important repercussions
on the alternative modes of ownership that are emerging for
future wireless networks. In this paper we focused on two of
these resources, spectrum and antennas, and their interplay in
an auction-based allocation mechanism.
The model discussed in this paper assumes that antennas
can be shared among different operators. Due to its non-rival
nature, antennas cannot be sold at auction and their price is
fixed. However, to eliminate the potential risk exposure that
bidders would face if they acquired spectrum and antennas
separately, we devised a combined allocation mechanism so
that bidders can obtain the exact bundle of antennas and
spectrum that they need.
Economics theory teaches us that complementary monopo-
lies are typically less efficient than monopolies that hold all
the complementary goods. This is because, in the cases of
complementary monopolies, both firms benefit from increasing
their prices to increase total revenue while simultaneously
reducing demand for the complementary good. This results
in a reduced overall demand in the market. This is the trend
we observe in our results, even though antennas and spectrum
are also partially substitute goods. When antennas become
more expensive, a smaller number of bidders can be satisfied
and a lower combined revenue is obtained. It is possible to
counteract this effect by negotiating an agreement between
the antenna and the spectrum providers before the auction.
For example, the agreement could include a provision under
which a proportion of the total revenue is paid to the antenna
provider. Antenna access would be at a very low charge that
appears as a maintenance access fee. Another possibility is to
view the antennas as a platform connecting VNOs to spectrum.
From platform economics theory, the platform can decide how
to split the usage charge between the two sides of the market.
For example the antenna provider could charge the spectrum
provider access to the antennas and provide the antennas for
free to the VNOs.
Even more complex scenarios arise when we consider mul-
tiple spectrum and antenna providers pooling their resources.
The case of multiple spectrum providers is of particular
interest in the context of the LSA framework and the PCAST
three-tiered spectrum-sharing model, due to the presence of
multiple incumbents in both cases. Also, in 2016 FCC will
hold the Broadcast Television Incentive Auction in which TV
broadcasters will voluntarily bid to relinquish their spectrum
usage rights in exchange for a cash payout (reverse auction)
and wireless providers will bid to acquire the relinquished
spectrum (forward auction). An evolution of the work pre-
sented in this paper will be to investigate the impact of
acquiring infrastructure and spectrum in these scenarios and to
design suitable mechanisms to mitigate the effects of possible
divergent interests between the different stakeholders.
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